Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, has taken control of the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, the headquarters of the Southern Miliary District, in the most serious challenge to Putin’s leadership to date. Prigozhin says that he has 25,000 troops available and is willing to march on Moscow.
Back on May 9, when Prigozhin’s challenge to Vladimir Putin first became evident, I argued in The Spectator against the idea that Putin was “in charge” of the situation. That analysis was based on the sense — confirmed since then — that Prigozhin’s complaints about Wagner ammunition and attacks on a certain “happy grandpa” running the war effort seriously undermined Putin’s authority.
This isn’t meant to happen in Putin’s system. Putin’s system allows for minions to attack each other but never undermine the vertical structure. Prigozhin crossed that line. And Putin had to respond. But Putin’s distant response to that challenge in May — he continued to act as if nothing was happening, and only recently seemed to throw his lot with the Ministry of Defense endorsing the idea that Wagner should be subordinated to it — sent a signal right down the system.
Meanwhile, Prigozhin clearly understood that his time was running out, and that now was the time to move. Three factors possibly played a role. One is certain. Two are speculative (on my part). The first factor is the Ukrainian counteroffensive, which tied up the Russian military.
The second (and here I speculate), is that Prigozhin probably sensed that Putin was coming round to the idea of endorsing his rival, defense minister Sergei Shoigu (Putin was previously ambivalent, floating above the whole conflict). Shoigu’s deadline — July 1 — for Wagner subordinating to the Russian military is just around the corner.
The third factor (and this would explain the panicked reaction in Moscow), is that Prigozhin has people on the inside who are backing him, supporting his bid for power. The Ministry of Defense put out statements by Prigozhin’s ostensible former ally General Sergei Surovikin (Prigozhin had previously called for Surovikin to be put in charge of the Ministry of Defense), and by deputy head of the GRU (now known as GU) Vladimir Alekseev. Both condemned Prigozhin’s bid for power. Yet hours later Alekseev was filmed in Rostov receiving a dressing down from Prigozhin.
Could it be the FSB that’s backing Prigozhin? Obviously not, since they want Prigozhin arrested. Viktor Zolotov, Director of the National Guard of Russia? Who else? As so often with Kremlinology, we can see that dogs are fighting under the carpet but we won’t know who will prevail until one emerges on top. What we can see is that Putin came down fast and hard this time. He made a video statement, accusing Prigozhin of stabbing Russia in the back. He promised to inflict “unavoidable punishment” on his former client.
Where does all of this lead? Here there are three possibilities. First, Prigozhin succeeds in his coup in Moscow, leading to Putin’s ousting and/or death. The chances of this happening are slim but stranger things have happened. This would be a “clean coup scenario.”
Russia is in a state of a deep crisis, unlike anything it has experienced since 1991
The second is that Prigozhin is able to capture and hold a regional base (such as Rostov, where his troops are now). Combined with the rapidly deteriorating situation in Ukraine (where Russian forces are trying to hold the front against the advancing Ukrainian forces), this could really then deteriorate into a nasty and prolonged struggle. Let’s call it a “civil war scenario.” The chances of this happening are less than even.
Third, Prigozhin is captured and/or killed. Wagner is defeated. We would then expect an announcement from the Kremlin that Prigozhin was in fact a CIA agent. The result will be a further turn towards brutal repressions in Russia. Let’s call this “a Kirov scenario,” named so after the mysterious murder of Sergei Kirov in 1934, which gave Stalin the pretext for attacking his perceived enemies (this led in time to the Great Purge). Chances: fair.
Russia is in a state of a deep crisis, unlike anything it has experienced since 1991. Then, an attempted military/KGB coup against Mikhail Gorbachev lasted only three days. The coup plotters lacked the will and the determination to take power into their hands. The failure of the 1991 attempt led in short order to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In August 1917, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army Lavr Kornilov attempted a march on St. Petersburg (then Russia’s capital city), ostensibly to rein in the Bosheviks and reimpose government control. His attempted military coup fizzled out, but in helped contribute to chaos that brought the Bolsheviks to power that November. There followed a brutal civil war that cost Russia millions of lives. Putin mentioned the 1917 precedent in his address to the Russian people. Clearly, he, too, is aware of the dangerous parallels.
Russia has a rich history of failed coups. They rarely bring closure. Prigozhin, with his projected March on Moscow, is drawing on the same unhappy tradition. The results cannot be foretold. But Russian history has ways of reasserting itself.
This article was originally published on The Spectator’s UK website.
