On Thursday, the United States and the United Kingdom launched two rounds of strikes against seventy-two Houthi targets in Yemen — a turn of events that is unsurprising given the joint statement issued to the Houthis a week prior, which read like an ultimatum. The Houthis have attacked civilian vessels in the Red Sea twenty-seven times since November 19, most recently less than twenty-four hours before the American and British bombs started falling. John Kirby, Joe Biden’s national security spokesman, told reporters a day later on Air Force One that “valid, legitimate military targets” were struck and that Washington would do what is necessary if the Houthis continued on their present course.
This isn’t the first time Washington and London have taken military action against the Houthis. Over the last several weeks, US and UK warships have shot down numerous Houthi missiles and drones. On New Year’s Eve, US helicopters even destroyed three boats seeking to attack a civilian ship, killing the Houthi militants onboard.
This latest military action, however, was far more expansive. The target set included, but was not limited to, Houthi-operated training centers and drone manufacturing sites, coastal radar sites, munitions warehouses, and even command-and-control facilities in multiple Yemeni cities. The American military carried out these attacks easily, if not flawlessly. Washington, after all, has conducted many similar strikes in Iraq and Syria since late October, even killing militia commanders.
Yet just as those strikes failed to deter additional attacks, the strikes in Yemen are unlikely to compel the Houthis to cease threatening the security of commercial shipping by treating the Red Sea as their personal firing range.
The Houthis are used to being on the receiving end of superior firepower
First, the Houthis have demonstrated a willingness to absorb a lot of pain. They have fought a number of wars since forming their movement in the 1990s. In each engagement, the Houthis were the inferior party in military equipment, personnel and economic resources. Yet they persevered through sheer will, ideological fervor, and the simple but crucial ability to outlast their opponents.
Successive Yemeni government military campaigns in the Houthi’s northern strongholds during the 2004-2010 time period resulted at best in a draw for the state, which opted for ceasefires after failing to eliminate the group or push it toward major political concessions. Likewise, Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars a month and expended tens of thousands of bombs over a span of nearly a decade to overthrow the Houthis in Sana’a and reinstate the internationally-recognized government there, only to conclude that military force couldn’t achieve their objective. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who believed he could win the war in weeks, has instead tasked his subordinates with negotiating a face-saving exit from an unwinnable war. The Houthis, in short, are used to being on the receiving end of superior firepower and have frequently emerged intact, if not stronger.
Second, while airstrikes will degrade at least some of the Houthis’ military capacity over the short-term, the long-term effect will be limited. Advocates of US military force point to an instance in 2016, when Washington destroyed three Houthi radar installations and stopped Houthi attacks on US warships. But at that time, the Houthis were mired in a civil war against the Saudi-backed Yemeni government and simply couldn’t afford to pick a fight with the US. Today, they are much stronger, closer to Iran politically, control roughly 80 percent of Yemen’s population, and are equipped with a variety of drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and anti-ship ballistic missiles. Some of those missiles can reach US military bases in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have first-hand experience with Houthi missiles, their airports and energy facilities having been targeted over the years. It’s not a given that the Houthis will use those weapons to attack a US base in the region to the strike on their homeland, but US policymakers can’t rule the danger out entirely.
Third, for the US, military action against Houthi redoubts in Yemen may turn out to be the equivalent of cutting one’s nose to spite one’s face. Since April 2022, the Biden administration has devoted significant diplomatic attention and resources to try and maintain a ceasefire in hopes that calm on the ground would improve UN, mediation efforts between the Houthis, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces and other entities. That already difficult job will now become even harder after US bombs crashed into Houthi targets. Indeed, the Houthis could pull out of UN-sponsored peace talks, a step that would not only frustrate US goals but also increase the odds of the already-fragile truce falling apart entirely.
US officials view the airstrikes against Houthi targets as a low-cost move to demonstrate that attacks on international shipping will not be tolerated. Biden called the strikes a success. Tactically speaking, he’s correct: some Houthi capabilities were destroyed. Strategically, though, the answer depends on whether the Houthis actually stop what they’re doing.
This article was originally published on The Spectator’s UK website.
