Will there be a second phase of the Gaza ceasefire?

The end of February, which coincides with the start of Ramadan, was meant to mark the conclusion of the initial exchange of Israeli hostages held by Hamas for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. However, rather than engaging as planned on what should happen, how, and when in the second phase, the ceasefire appears to be stalling and the parties sliding inexorably towards stalemate or renewed conflict.

So far, the ceasefire that started on January 19, the day before President Trump’s inauguration, has defied the expectations of many. The conflict in Gaza stopped and more deliveries of humanitarian aid were allowed to reach displaced and desperate Palestinian refugees. Twenty-five Israeli hostages have been returned by Hamas and Israel has reciprocated with the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. Hamas has also returned the remains of some dead hostages. Palestinians have returned to the rubble of their homes and an uneasy detente has settled on the Gaza strip. 

What has gone wrong? Why does a second phase of the ceasefire seem increasingly unlikely to materialize? Both sides accuse the other of flaunting the agreement. Israel is delaying the release of about 600 more Palestinians. That is in protest at the shocking physical condition in which some hostages have come home and the distasteful, triumphal parading by Hamas of hostages about to be released. Benjamin Netanyahu has threatened to block second phase negotiations and begin fighting again if the hostage handover spectacles continue and all the remaining hostages are not released. He has massed his forces at the borders of Gaza, and in recent days the Israeli military have been undertaking a significant military operation in the Occupied West Bank, killing tens of Palestinians. 

As phase one slips away, the challenge of negotiating the next phase grows. Under the agreement brokered by the US, Egypt and Qatar, the end of the first phase would see Israel withdraw within eight days its forces from the Philadelphi Corridor on the Egyptian border. The prospects of that happening anytime soon seem slim. Then in the second phase, the remaining sixty or so Israeli hostages still alive should be released. These hostages are Hamas’ main negotiating chip, so it is hard to envisage their release before Hamas has secured guarantees paving the way for a long-term ceasefire. 

We should not be surprised by any of this. The Israel-Palestine story has consistently frustrated any misplaced diplomatic optimism for almost a century. The reason this particular chapter is so fraught with risk is because the ceasefire was really no more than the word describes. The detail was meant to be thrashed out in negotiations for the second and third phases. So far, only preliminary discussions have taken place. 

There remains a fundamental contradiction in both Israel’s and Hamas’s stated aims. Neither recognizes the other’s legitimacy, and Netanyahu’s war objectives made clear that Hamas should be destroyed. The televised hostage releases show Hamas terrorists armed and apparently far from disarming, or from disappearing as the force controlling Gaza. 

Netanyahu faces a choice: to accept Hamas’ continued existence; or to fail to secure the release of the remaining hostages. Given that a majority of Israelis apparently prioritize getting hostages out of Gaza, Netanyahu will have to use all of his political and survival acumen to navigate the coming weeks.

So, what next? The international mediators are also showing signs of disunity. President Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, who seems to have played a decisive role in securing the ceasefire agreement, returns to the region this week. He supports an extension to phase one which would allow negotiations on phase two to start. Hamas may be open to that, though Netanyahu’s recent statements might suggest little appetite from his government to engage in further negotiations. It appears that Egypt opposes an extension.

Much has been made of President Trump’s colorful — fantastical? — rhetoric describing the apocalyptic rubble of Gaza transformed into a riviera on the eastern Mediterranean with Palestinians moved to somewhere safer and better, such as Egypt or Jordan. Global and regional leaders, including many US allies, dismissed the idea summarily, and it was described as ethnic cleansing by the Arabs. Only Netanyahu and Israel’s political right embraced the proposal. The Trump team subsequently qualified and distanced itself from literal interpretation of the president’s vision. Trump himself has since said he would not force it to happen and that it was for the Israelis to decide.

Some of the richer and more powerful Arab states appear to recognize the time has come to step up

If we have learned anything about the Trump playbook over the past nine years, it should be that more often than not — with a few notable exceptions — the president’s wilder ideas should be taken seriously but not literally. He tends to be a disruptor without a detailed plan. This is dangerous, even reckless, but can sometimes yield results. Having shaken the box, long-fixed positions can in some cases be unpicked and new possibilities — as well as risks — opened up. 

It took a dramatic Trump threat before his inauguration to catalyze the ceasefire agreement following fifteen months of seemingly endless conflict. It will likely take another such intervention to move Israel and Hamas back to the negotiating table and into a second phase of the ceasefire. The unrealistic riviera proposal will not come to pass as Trump described it. Without the prospect of and a roadmap towards a Palestinian state there will be no sustained peace for Israel and its neighbors.  

Some of the richer and more powerful Arab states appear to recognize the time has come to step up and not rely on the US or Europeans to provide the answers. That is why in parallel — no doubt partially galvanized by Trump’s outrageous and provoking rhetoric — the Gulf Cooperation Council, plus Egypt and Jordan, met on February 21 to prepare a summit in Cairo on March 4 that will seek to lay out a plan for the stabilization and rebuilding of Gaza. It foresees no role for Hamas but is clear that Palestine must be under Palestinian control.  

Unpalatable US cajoling, combined with Arab leadership and investment, may prove to be the best hope for saving the fragile ceasefire. Without an extraordinary diplomatic gambit that pushes the limits and forces new approaches, the agreement may unravel and never reach its second phase. That would simply result in further cycles of conflict and the pointless further bloodshed of innocent people.