What is Israel’s plan in Syria?

Israeli leaders recently made clear that the IDF’s current military deployment into south-west Syria is not intended as a stop-gap measure until its northern neighbor stabilizes. Rather, in a speech last week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told IDF officer cadets that the force’s troops would stay on the formerly Syrian side of Mount Hermon, and in the buffer zone carved out to the east of the Golan Heights for “an unlimited period of time.”

Israel’s incursion into Syria to disrupt a perceived threat resembles other foreign entries into Syria,

In a statement appearing to hint at a yet more ambitious Israeli strategy, the prime minister added that Israel demanded the “full demilitarization of southern Syria from troops of the new Syrian regime in the Quneitra, Daraa and Suweyda provinces.” In the same week, Israeli defense minister Israel Katz said:

We will not allow the extreme Islamic regime in Syria to harm the Druze. If the regime harms the Druze, it will be struck by us…We are committed to our Druze brothers in Israel to do everything to prevent harm to their Druze brothers in Syria, and we will take all the steps required to maintain their safety.

These remarks were followed by an additional statement from Israel’s defense ministry according to which IDF troops had been ordered to “prepare to defend” Jaramana, a Druze suburb of Damascus. This followed clashes between armed Druze and fighters associated with the current regime’s security forces.  

These moves come against a background in which Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the Sunni Islamist group which seized power in Syria in December 2024, is moving to consolidate its rule. On February 25, a long-awaited “national dialogue conference” took place at the presidential place in Damascus, formerly the dwelling of the ousted dictator Bashar Assad.  

The conference brought together 600 selected Syrians and concluded with the appointment of a seven-member committee tasked with drawing up a “constitutional declaration.” The conference issued a number of additional nonbinding resolutions. HTS leader Ahmed Sharaa has said that it could take up to four years for elections to be held. In the meantime, Sharaa himself, along with a number of fellow Sunni Islamists from HTS, will continue as the de facto rulers of the country.  

The consolidation of HTS rule in Damascus, and Israel’s actions further south, are directly linked. Israel views the emergent regime in Damascus as characterized by three factors: a Sunni Islamist/jihadi orientation, strong links to Turkey and relative weakness. It is acting accordingly.  

Regarding the first issue, for the foreseeable future, the administration assembled by Ahmed Sharaa from among his HTS comrades from Idlib is set to rule Syria. HTS’s highest religious authority, one Abd al Rahim Atoun, offered enthusiastic support for the October 7 massacres in southern Israel. 

Atoun said at the time that “what the mujahideen are doing for the sake of Allah Almighty in the Battle of the Flood of Al-Aqsa is the greatest act of Islam in this era, and it is a blessed jihad to repel aggression and defend religion.” Post October 7, Israel is disinclined to take chances regarding Islamist and jihadi movements professing sentiments of this kind.  

Regarding the Turkish link, the HTS authorities in Damascus owe their victory largely to Turkey. This enabled them to maintain their fiefdom in Idlib for the seven years between 2017 and their victory in 2024. Turkey is overseeing the establishment of the new regime’s military and security forces. Discussions currently under way between the HTS authorities in Damascus and the Turkish government include the prospect of a defense pact between the two countries. Ankara, according to recent reports, wants to establish two air bases in the Badia, the large desert that covers much of central Syria.  

Turkey, in addition to its close relations with HTS, has been strongly supportive of Hamas both prior to and during the current war in Gaza. Erdogan’s government has long permitted Hamas to maintain an active office in Istanbul. This facility, Israel considers, is not focused solely on political and diplomatic tasks. Rather, it is a center for operational planning. In addition, Ankara has facilitated the activities of Hamas officials by providing them with Turkish passports. The AKP, the ruling party in Turkey, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, as is Hamas. The relationship between the two is thus both extensive, with deep foundations.  

Israel regards Turkey as an increasingly hostile state, with a sophisticated ability to make use of proxy non state and quasi-state organizations, similar to Iran. So from Jerusalem’s point of view, the emergence of an Islamist regime to the north, backed by a powerful, increasingly hostile state, is a matter of deep concern.  

The third notable element is HTS’s current weakness. With only 40,000 fighters at the time that it took power, the organization is struggling to exercise control even over the 70 percent of Syria nominally under its command (30 percent is controlled by the US-aligned, Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic Forces). 

As a result of recent experience in Gaza, Israel’s preference is now for buffer zones on hostile borders, keeping enemies as far as possible from Israeli communities. HTS’s failure to quickly consolidate its hold over Syria, because of its lack of available manpower, enabled Israel to act quickly and establish a de facto area of control into the buffer zone laid down by the Separation of Forces Agreement of 1974, and beyond it.  

In many ways, perhaps paradoxically, Israel’s incursion into Syria to disrupt a perceived threat resembles other foreign entries into Syria, including Turkey’s three extensive operations against Kurdish forces in Syria’s north, in 2016, 2018 and 2019. 

The level of cooperation between Israeli forces and elements of Syria’s Druze is hard to gauge. Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, the community’s spiritual leader, recently confirmed his commitment to a united Syria, and rejected any thought of “separatism.” At the same time, al-Hijri affirmed that armed Druze groups would maintain their weapons and refuse the entry of government forces into their areas until a representative government and a new constitution were established for Syria.  

It appears that other elements in the community have established more direct relations with Israel. In this regard, it is worth remembering that Israel has its own well established and non-marginal Druze community, which includes senior army officers and officials. These individuals are concerned for the well being of their fellow Druze in Syria, and are exercising their own influence in this area.  

So Israel appears to be pursuing a coherent strategy in Syria, which is in direct opposition to that of Turkey and its Islamist clients. This is a significant new development on the Middle East stage. It remains to be seen if, when and how these two projects collide.