Why airstrikes on the Houthis will fail

The United States has begun what may well prove to be a long — and likely doomed — campaign of airstrikes against Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, in Yemen.

For a year and a half since October 2023, the Houthis have been highly successful in disrupting shipping in the Red Sea, launching missiles and drones at cargo ships, oil tankers, and passenger vessels — hitting some, sinking fewer, and inconveniencing millions.

Every conflict the US has engaged in since 2001 has ended before America achieved its objectives.

While few ships have been hit, even fewer have been sunk, and fewer still have resulted in casualties, the numbers speak for themselves. Fewer and fewer ships are passing through the region, including using the Suez Canal to shorten travel times between Asia and Europe. Global shipping costs have risen sharply. Supply chains took an initial shock and continued to suffer as the Houthi campaign persisted and expanded.

The Houthis claimed their actions were a protest against Israel’s bombing and occupation of Gaza and that they only targeted ships traveling to and from Israel, those owned by Israeli companies, or those carrying Israeli goods or insurance. This was never true — though the Houthi campaign did reduce traffic to and from the Israeli port of Eilat. Instead, the Houthis targeted all ships opportunistically, using missiles seemingly in endless supply, drones, and fast attack boats reminiscent of those used by pirates in the Horn of Africa in this century.

Meanwhile, Houthi propaganda has featured footage of small teams of black-clad “special forces” descending onto Red Sea vessels by helicopter, mimicking similar operations conducted by the British Special Boat Service and others.

Some shipping companies appear to have managed to pay the Houthis off, though this remains unconfirmed. But this follows the logic of piracy. It is not in the developed world’s interest for it to continue.

In December 2023, the US Navy and military forces from multiple countries — both regional and more distant — formed Operation Prosperity Guardian to patrol the Red Sea and surrounding areas. Hundreds of Houthi missiles and drones were intercepted, aiming to protect shipping in those waters. That campaign, though it suffered few losses (aside from some friendly fire incidents), was an unequivocal failure. Houthi missile stockpiles did not appear to diminish, and their Iranian sponsors did not abandon them. Global shipping remained costly, and traffic around Yemen remained low.

Since January 2024, the US and Britain have waged a campaign of airstrikes and interceptions against the Houthis. There have been hundreds of strikes on targets across Yemen, particularly around western port cities like Hodeida. British Typhoon jets scrambling from Cyprus have joined American carrier-based aircraft in a series of attacks on missiles and radar installations. Before March 2025, the American campaign was consistent but not intense. According to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, it was largely retaliatory: when a Houthi barrage targeted shipping or the US Navy, the Americans would strike pre-identified targets — military-controlled airports, suspected missile warehouses, and similar sites.

This campaign has not worked. The US believes it has reduced the Houthis’ capacity to attack shipping and likely saved some lives in the Red Sea. But it has not restored trade. Incremental strikes are easy to match. The Houthis may lose personnel and equipment, but they can harden their defenses, learn to disperse their assets, and continue fighting indefinitely.

If the US were truly committed, it would be relentlessly striking Yemen to keep the Houthis suppressed, with the ultimate goal of doing to them what Israel has done to other Iranian proxy forces in Gaza and Lebanon — Hamas and Hezbollah — by eliminating their leadership, destroying their missile stockpiles, and crippling their command and control to the point that resistance becomes futile.

But this strategy has been tried before. In the 2010s, a Saudi-led coalition backed by the US — and to a lesser extent, Britain — launched a large-scale intervention in Yemen in support of the UN-recognized government. It poured munitions into the country, yet the campaign failed. After years of fighting, the Saudis effectively withdrew. The Houthis, meanwhile, used the conflict to integrate Iranian missile and drone technology, launching missiles at Riyadh, the Saudi oil industry, and the United Arab Emirates — almost all of which passed without a serious response from the US or regional powers.

The Houthis are a serious threat and may deserve a campaign as destructive as the one Israel is waging against Hezbollah. For now, the Houthis’ Iranian sponsors appear nervous, falsely claiming that the Houthis are independent rather than their proxies and insisting that Yemen has the right to determine its own future.

But given the history of this century, can we really believe that the United States has the intelligence and resolve to sustain such a strategy? The US has not won a sustained campaign this century. Every conflict it has engaged in since 2001 has ended before it achieved its goals—after its leaders lost interest and abandoned local allies, content to fire occasional missiles and drone strikes to maintain the illusion of control.

The United States could cripple the Houthi movement as Israel has temporarily crippled Hezbollah. But will it? Some in Washington are optimistic. I am not. Why should it work this time when it has failed before?