Neoconservative moment

In younger MAGA circles, “neocon” is a term of derision. It’s not always clear what twenty-somethings understand by the word, though its rough connotations are plain enough: “globalist” (often paired with “neocon”) and “forever wars.” The latter is what the US has fought continuously since the Soviet Union stood down thirty-five years ago — at great cost with no victories.

Neoconservatism was the dominant strain of elite conservatism in the US from the Reagan era until fairly recently. So the new MAGA outlook might seem like a decisive turnabout in political and intellectual fashion. In some ways it is. Donald Trump mocked the neoconservatives’ most infamous project, the Iraq War, during his 2016 campaign and won nonetheless. The President then won again, eight years later, establishing himself as a transformational figure in American politics.

But, as ever, the reality is more complicated. Trump achieved no dramatic break from neoconservatism in his first term. His two most important foreign policy appointments went to men prominent in the neoconservative consensus: national security adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. No one in his administration was a noted opponent of the Iraq War. One can conjure up explanations: Trump’s lack of familiarity with Washington foreign pol- icy specialists, the burdens imposed by the Democratic Party’s “Russiagate” impeachment gambit. But there was little in Trump’s first term that constituted any kind of dramatic break with previous Republican (or Democratic) foreign policy.

Before analyzing Trump II, one must recognize that the divisions between neocons and their opponents (traditional conservatives, realists, paleocons) don’t have the salience they did twenty years ago. Calling current philosophies a “fusion” overstates the case. But the most significant gatherings of conservatives in the past six years have probably been the “National Conservative” conferences held under the direction of the Israeli-American author and thinktank entrepreneur Yoram Hazony. Hazony recognized that many of the divisions between neocons and their foes were no longer particularly relevant. At his conferences (I attended the first one in 2019) there are plenty of people chatting amiably who would have shunned one another in 2005. Hazony’s key insight was that the neoconservatives were probably wrong to oppose immigration restriction as effectively as they did. It’s now forgotten, but the ideas of neoconservatism — from the 1990s onward — were deployed not only to promote foreign wars, but to marginalize those who were worried about excessive immigration. The polemical tropes used by neocons called anyone skeptical of mass migration a racist of the worst sort, an heir to the 1920s immigration restrictionists whose policies resulted in Jewish deaths.

This began to change only in the last dozen years, as certain cohorts of Muslim migrants to Europe showed a marked affinity for crime and terrorism, not infrequently targeting Jews. Hazony’s “national conservatism” meant that it was legitimate, actually vital, for conservatives to treasure something more than embracing free markets and opposing foreign dictators. They had to promote national communities, habits and mores of western nations as necessary repositories of freedom.

Obvious as this might seem, it was almost a taboo observation on the establishment right until Donald Trump came along, and Hazony helped amplify and legitimize it among thousands of journalists and conservative activists throughout the West.

If neocons or former neocons gave ground on immigration, what of the other side? Here the answer is less concrete: Hazonyism (whatever his foreign policy views, reputed to be hawkish) didn’t address foreign policy. But one argument long made by the pro-Israel right began to seem, if not obviously correct, not obviously wrong either: Israel has no Palestinian leadership with whom it could make a viable peace.

The rise of the avowedly eliminationist Hamas — and the popularity of the terror group among the western left — reinforced this notion. This has warmed attitudes towards Israel among erstwhile foes of neoconservatism. Look at Vice President J.D. Vance: an eloquent opponent of mass immigration and an avowed and enthusiastic Zionist. It’s a political combination which hardly existed fifteen years ago.

Where does this portend for Trump II? This time Trump came into office determined to actually govern — and in foreign policy to break with the past. Long gone are Bolton and Pompeo; in now are Vance and the dovish director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. They represent a new generation of Trumpists: people who served in the wars the neocons sold to the nation and ended up rejecting their rationale.

Neoconservatism can seem a spent force: the Weekly Standard, the journal which did so much to advance the Iraq War, is defunct. Its founder Bill Kristol is now a standard anti-Trumper. Secretary of State Marco Rubio was the preferred candidate of neoconservatives in 2016. Now he performs capably as Trump’s “America First” Secretary of State.

Meghan McCain, the daughter of the most neoconservative-friendly candidate ever to win the GOP nomination, is a close friend of Gabbard, and was influential in getting her through a tightly contested confirmation. Meghan loves her late father, but says explicitly she doesn’t share his foreign policy views. Tom Cotton — a hawkish, ambitious and talented young senator — was a protégé of Kristol. Yet Cotton, to the surprise of many, ably shepherded Gabbard through her confirmation process.

Behind it all is Trump, whose Ukraine machinations have shocked the world. Ukraine has never been a particularly neoconservative issue. Israel has not been a zealous fan of Ukrainian nationalism and remains on cordial terms with Russia. Several older neoconservative intellectuals have notably backed a negotiated end to the conflict. But a potential conflict between Trump and what remains of the neoconservative consensus remains the Middle East. This fight will not be over Israel specifically. Virtually all of Trumpworld supports Israel over Hamas. The battle will be over whether the United States can be induced, or drawn in, to support Israel in a war against Iran.

Trump’s instincts are against this. He may be the most pro-Israel president in our history, but he doesn’t want to fight Iran. To the extent that neoconservatism retains influence, that will be a point of contention.

This article was originally published in The Spectator’s April 2025 World edition.