Joe Biden’s introduction of the three-stage deal to end the war in Gaza was a clever rout to bypass Benjamin Netanyahu. Biden has lost confidence in Netanyahu’s readiness to present things to the Israeli public, and to his own cabinet, in an honest and truthful way. By presenting the terms of the deal clearly and independently from Netanyahu’s spins, Biden was in full control of the message, in the hope that the Israeli public will back the deal and make it impossible for Netanyahu to back out of it.
Netanyahu’s already unstable coalition is on even shakier ground now
Netanyahu has spent the past eight months maneuvering between the demands from far-right members of his coalition, who oppose deals with Hamas, and centrist members who are pushing for a deal that will release the hostages. Each side has repeatedly threatened to leave the coalition and topple the government. Netanyahu has desperately tried to save his government, even at the price of damaging relations with Biden and other allies, undermining war efforts and negotiations for a ceasefire deal.
While members of Netanyahu’s own party, Likud, have half-heartedly criticized the deal, which they view as a victory for Hamas, hawkish ultra-nationalist ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich have threatened to leave and break apart the coalition if the deal is agreed to. Both reject any deal that will keep Hamas in power and include the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. Both also have a troubling history of calling for a “voluntary emigration” of Palestinians from Gaza and for the rebuilding of settlements in Gaza — which isn’t, and won’t be, Israel’s policy.
On the other side are Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, who joined the wartime coalition days into the war against Hamas. Gantz has already threatened to withdraw from the coalition. He gave Netanyahu a list of demands with the deadline being this Saturday. Should Netanyahu agree to the deal, it’s likely that Gantz — who enjoys a positive relationship with Biden — will remain in the coalition. If Netanyahu rejects the deal, under pressure from the right, Gantz’s withdrawal in itself won’t break the coalition, but it will leave it with a smaller majority in the Knesset (sixty-four out of 120 seats). It may also trigger others to pull out, including defense minister Yoav Gallant, and inflame the ongoing mass anti-government protests.
Ben-Gvir and Smotrich have threatened to leave the coalition numerous times and have yet to do so. One reason is Netanyahu’s capitulation to some of their demands. The other is that they’re reluctant to find themselves outside of government, perhaps permanently, with no power or influence.
Meanwhile, The ultra-orthodox parties in Netanyahu’s government are a lot less reluctant to leave the coalition, and have credibly threatened to do so if orthodox men no longer enjoy an exemption from national service. If the ceasefire deal won’t topple the government, this politically explosive issue might. The exemption is currently being debated, and, although the majority of the public — including many of Netanyahu’s voters — object to the exemption, Netanyahu would do anything to keep the ultra-orthodox parties in the coalition.
The ceasefire deal still has a lot of unknowns. Most importantly, it doesn’t stipulate who will be in control of Gaza after the war. Despite Biden’s claim that Hamas is no longer a threat, the terror organization has retained some offensive capabilities and can recover after the war with the help of Iran and Qatar — unless there are measures to prevent this. A full withdrawal of Israeli forces, without creating a small but meaningful buffer zone between Gaza and Israel and giving up control of the Philadelphi corridor — Hamas’s lifeline — will compromise Israel’s security. Netanyahu’s mishandling of the war, his lack of long-term planning and tendency to avoid making tough decisions, means that Israel needs to accept a deal that’s far from ideal or keep fighting a war that has no strategic outlook.
Netanyahu’s already unstable coalition is on even shakier ground now. If Hamas rejects the deal, it’ll save Netanyahu (for now), but place Hamas in a direct collision course with the US, and possibly even with Qatar. If they accept the deal, Netanyahu may have to choose between it, or the future of his government.
This article was originally published on The Spectator’s UK website.
