Can Israel stomach another war?

It was late in 1997 when I got to a small military base on the border between Israel and Lebanon. Straight out of training, my welcome to the base involved sitting in the war room wearing a helmet and a bulletproof vest, hoping that the barrage of rockets flying over our heads, courtesy of Hezbollah, wouldn’t hit.

It was time of constant clashes with Hezbollah in south Lebanon. Casualties were commonplace. I’ve been to too many funerals and have seen too many parents bury their sons — my friends, peers and brothers in arms — than I’d care to remember. It was also a time when the Israeli public grew tired of Israel’s long presence in Lebanon. The war was attritional and there were many casualties. Protest movements emerged and people were wondering whether winning was worth its price. All of this led to Israel’s hurried withdrawal in May 2000.

Israelis are willing to fight on, and accept that things will get worse before they get better

Nearly a year into the war against Hamas, with the terror organization now on its knees, Israel seems determined to direct its resources to fight Hezbollah once again.

Israel aims to push terrorists away from the border to reduce Hezbollah’s ability to launch an attack similar to Hamas’s October 7 massacre. Hezbollah is known to have planned such an attack, which could’ve resulted in thousands of casualties and and lots of people being taken hostage. Damaging Hezbollah’s capabilities by attacking weapons arsenals and infrastructure are all part of Israel’s goal. This should allow the 60,000 Israeli civilians who have been evacuated from their homes nearly a year ago to return north, and restore safety and deterrence to the area.

Last week’s actions represent a dramatic shift from the limited actions Israel has taken since Hezbollah started attacking it on October 8. It started with thousands of pagers exploding, and a day later, walkie-talkies blew up too. This was a major triumph for Israel’s intelligence agencies. It not only humiliated Hezbollah, it brought down their communication system and disabled many of their fighters. Since then, Israel has been bombing targets, including a long-range heavy cruise missile that Hezbollah had planned to launch into Israel.

Israel has now called on Lebanese civilians to evacuate areas where Hezbollah stores weapons, indicting that the attacks will continue. This has also caused an escalation in Hezbollah’s assaults.

However, unless recent attacks push Hezbollah into accepting a truce, Israel’s goals cannot be achieved by airpower alone. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is preparing for a ground invasion. This will see ground troops, tanks and other forces cross into southern Lebanon in order to push the terrorists past the Litany River — some twenty-five miles away from the border — and where Hezbollah should’ve kept it’s forces according he UN Security Council resolution 1701, of which it’s in violation.

Considering Israel’s trauma from its protracted war in Lebanon, which Israelis refer to as “the swamp,” because once sunk in, it’s extremely difficult to come out of, the ground option isn’t an attractive one to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israeli society has proven its resilience, but the war has taken its toll. A large number of reserve soldiers have left everything behind — families, jobs, university — and have suffered the financial and emotional price of fighting Hamas for many months. They are fatigued, and so are their partners, left behind as sole carers and providers.

Despite this, the threat posed by Hezbollah is significant, and Israelis are willing to fight on, and accept that things will get worse before they get better. They are willing to pay the price of another war, one that could prove even more challenging than fighting Hamas and may also include Iran.

Netanyahu will have to manage this war extremely carefully to avoid resilience fading. Hezbollah is more powerful than when Israel fought it last with mixed results, and the IDF won’t have the assistance of its old ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which was dismantled in 2000.

Netanyahu is looking to replace experienced Defense Minister Yoav Gallant with anyone, whatever their experience, as long as they’re loyal. This would be a bad move that will anger the public. It’s crucial that the government sets clear and achievable goals and avoids establishing a prolonged presence in southern Lebanon for which the public has no appetite.

This article was originally published on The Spectator’s UK website.